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TTIP: A Free Trade Agreement That Strengthens the 
International Trade Environment and Enhances the 
Regulatory Powers of the WTO 
Suzanne De Deyne 
ABSTRACT: 
“Power Politics is Back, Multilateralism is Dying” 
 – Zaki Laidi1 
This comment discusses the Transatlantic Trade Investment 
Partnership (TTIP or the Partnership), a bi-lateral trade agreement be-
tween the United States and the European Union, in relation to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). TTIP pushes the world towards 
greater trade liberalization, and if implemented, such a trade agree-
ment would affect trillions of dollars in existing trade. When trade 
barriers are reduced, a significant amount of new possibilities open 
up, especially in regards to potential markets for exports, growth and 
improvement of competitive products, and reduction in the losses as-
sociated with the complicated clearance processes and regulations at 
the border. Since its establishment, the WTO has sought to establish 
an agreement between its members to reduce tariffs and facilitate free 
trade. However, it has failed to fulfill its role as a rule-maker, particu-
larly via trade agreements, due to multi-polarity and a decline in 
United States hegemony. The analysis provided discusses how the 
Partnership could advance the function of the WTO because the im-
plementation of an international bilateral trade agreement removes 
the rule-maker duty from the WTO and, instead, allows the WTO to 
focus on the area of dispute resolution, thus taking on a more “soft-
law” approach within international trade, and ideally, returning to its 
full potential.   
 
 
 
 1. Larry Cata Backer, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Japan, China, the U.S., and the 
Emerging Shape of a New World Trade Regulatory Order, 13 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 49, 58 (2014). 
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Introduction 
The Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership (TTIP, or the 
Partnership) is a major free trade and investment agreement that is 
currently being negotiated, in secret, between the United States (U.S.) 
and the European Union (EU).2  It is being heralded as the biggest 
trade deal ever negotiated and if adopted, tariffs on all products ex-
changed across the Atlantic will be cut or eliminated.3  The central 
focus in the TTIP negotiations is to eliminate non-tariff barriers to 
trade by mitigating differences in regulations without disrupting the 
domestic purposes of the regulations.4  To seek trade liberalization, 
TTIP pinpoints three central components – market access, regulatory 
coherence, and international standards.5  By addressing these three 
components, the Partnership agreement hopes to create an opportuni-
ty for a significant boost to the U.S. and EU economies, as well as the 
overall global economy.  
Naturally, there are arguments for and against this multinational 
trade agreement.  One widespread concern is that TTIP will detri-
mentally affect the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The WTO is a 
global international organization that aims to help producers of goods 
and services, exporters, and importers conduct their businesses.6  The 
purpose of the WTO is to ensure that international trade flows as 
freely, smoothly, and predictably as possible.7   
A well-constructed TTIP would not necessarily conflict with the 
WTO.  The WTO is currently at a stalemate, and the Partnership 
could advance the aims of the WTO because it is an international bi-
lateral trade agreement that creates the opportunity for the WTO to 
transition and focus on dispute resolution, thus taking on a more 
“soft-law” approach within international trade, and as a result, return 
to its full potential. 
 
 2. SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43158, 
PROPOSED TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (T-TIP): IN BRIEF 
(2014). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Joseph Francois et al., Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment: An 
Economic Apprach, CENTRE FOR ECON. POL’Y RES. (Mar. 2013), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf.  
 5. AKHTAR & JONES, supra note 2. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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Background 
A. TTIP’s History  
In 1995, Klaus Kinkel, former Foreign Minister of Germany, put 
forward the main idea of the Partnership – the need for a transatlantic 
free trade area.8 In 1998, Leon Brittan, then EU Commissioner for 
Trade, pursued this idea by getting the European Commission to ap-
prove a plan for a “New Transatlantic Marketplace.”9  Then, in 2007, 
the U.S. and the EU agreed to the “Framework for Advancing Trans-
atlantic Economic Integration between the United States of America 
and the European Union,” which created the short-lived political 
body known as the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC).10  Finally 
in 2012, German Chancellor Angela Merkel publically asked digni-
taries to revive the negotiations regarding a transatlantic free trade ar-
ea.11  President Obama echoed this statement in his 2013 State of the 
Union address.12     
With two prominent international figureheads in support of a 
transatlantic free trade agreement, TTIP negotiations rose to the fore-
front.  The negotiations began in 2013 and are still underway today.  
Currently, TTIP negotiators in Washington and Brussels seek to tack-
le technical issues, such as regulatory cooperation in specific industry 
sectors.13  Negotiators will most likely wait to address political issues 
until late 2015.14 
 Additionally, it should be noted that much of the controversy 
regarding the TTIP negotiations is focused on a provision for inves-
tor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).  This provision would allow 
 
 8. Hansjoerg Heppe, TTIP – New Thrust for the Transatlantic Alliance, 19 LAW & BUS. 
REV. AM. 441, 442 (2013). 
 9. Id. at 442-43. 
 10. Id. at 443. TEC’s main purpose was to advance economic integration between the EU 
and the U.S. by overseeing and accelerating government-to-government cooperation. 
Id.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. U.S., EU Defer Dealing with Majority Political Issues in TTIP until Mid-2015, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE (JAN. 30, 2015), 
https://wtonewsstand.com/index.php?option=com_ppvuser&view=login&return=aHR
0cHM6Ly93dG9uZXdzc3RhbmQuY29tL2NvbXBvbmVudC9vcHRpb24sY29tX3Bw
di9JdGVtaWQsNDQ1L2lkLDI0ODcyMTcv.   
 14. Id.  
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companies to sue foreign governments over claims for unfair treat-
ment and, if successful, be entitled to compensation.15  Critics argue 
that including the investor-state dispute settlement provision will un-
dermine the power of national governments because governments 
will not be able to execute certain measures necessary to act in the 
best interests of their citizens.16  Specifically, opponents of ISDS 
generally worry that if corporate companies are able to sue foreign 
governments before an international tribunal, the sovereignty of do-
mestic courts will dissipate.17  Although this fear addresses a legiti-
mate concern, the central focus at hand here is the regulatory effect of 
TTIP and the potential rule-making capability of the Partnership in 
relation to the WTO’s survival.  
B. WTO’s History 
The WTO was established in 1995 and is the successor to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was found-
ed in the Bretton Woods Agreement post-World War II.18  Under 
GATT, trade rounds were held to discuss what is now the WTO’s 
overriding objective: to keep trade moving smoothly, freely, fairly, 
and predictably.19  The WTO achieves this goal by administering 
trade agreements, hosting trade negotiations, settling trade disputes, 
renewing national trade policies, assisting developing countries in 
trade policy issues, and collaborating with other international organi-
zations.20  
With about 160 members, the WTO accounts for about ninety-
five percent of world trade.21  Typically the entire membership makes 
decisions by consensus – a unique and sometimes detrimental factor 
 
 15. Leala Padmanabhan, TTIP: The EU-US Trade Deal Explained, BBC NEWS (DEC. 18, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30493297. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Alex Lawson, EU Trade Chief Calls for Realistic Approach to Reboot TTIP, LAW 360 
(2014).  
 18. The WTO in Brief: Part 1, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr01_e.htm (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2015). 
 19. The WTO in Brief: Part 2, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr02_e.htm (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2015). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. 
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in comparison to other international organizations.22  The WTO’s 
governing structure consists of four sectors.23  The WTO’s top-level 
decision-making body is the Ministerial Conference and this body 
meets at least once every two years.24  Below the Ministerial Confer-
ence is the General Council, who meets several times a year at head-
quarters located in Geneva, Switzerland.25  Reporting to the General 
Council are the Goods Council, Services Council, and Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) Council.26  If necessary, specialized committees, 
working groups, or working parties are created for individual agree-
ments and specific research concentrations, such as the environ-
ment.27   
The WTO consists of a Secretariat, which is located in Geneva, 
consists of approximately 640 staff members, and is headed by a di-
rector-general.28  Because WTO decisions are member-driven, the 
Secretariat’s main duties are to supply technical support, provide lim-
ited legal assistance in the dispute settlement process, and advise 
governments who wish to become members of the WTO.29 
i. Consensus Voting at the WTO 
World Trade Organization negotiators conducted a careful anal-
ysis of the consensus decision-making process and defined consensus 
ruling as, “rules [that] generate information on state preferences [and] 
make it possible to formulate legislative packages that favor the in-
terest of powerful states, yet can be accepted by all participating 
states, and generally considered legitimate by them.”30  The consen-
sus decision-making process is more formally explained in Section 
IX:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement, which established the World 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. WTO in Brief: Part 2, supra note 19. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Proper? Consensus-Based Bargaining 
and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 156 INT’L ORG. 339, 342 (2002), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078608?seq=4#page_scan_tab_contents.   
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Trade Organization.31  Section IX:1 states that the WTO practice is to 
“arrive at decisions by consensus; that, except as otherwise provided, 
a vote is only taken when it has not been possible to reach a consen-
sus; and that a consensus is reached if no Member, present at the 
meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed 
decision.”32   
In terms of trade facilitation at the WTO, and taking into account 
today’s modern globalized world, consensus voting is no longer a 
practical or productive method for reaching decisions and establish-
ing new rules.33  The consensus voting system has created a deadlock 
where members are unable to respond legislatively to a disagreement 
with a panel or to an Appellate Body’s legal interpretation, which en-
hances the already substantial amount of inefficiency.34  Furthermore, 
consensus voting does not provide every member the same ability to 
maintain vetoes and this inherently favors the status quo and makes it 
extremely difficult to achieve change and establish equality in re-
gards to decision-making and practical influence at the WTO.35  
C. Free Trade Agreements  
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are usually created as a treaty 
between two or more countries to establish a free trade area where 
goods and services can be exchanged across borders without tariffs, 
quotas, or other governmental impediments to international trade.36  
The reduction of trade barriers and creation of a transparent trading 
environment makes it easier and cheaper for participating countries to 
 
 31. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,  
1869 U.N.T.S. 379 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
 32. Id.  In 1995, the General Council of the WTO agreed that consensus-based decision-
making would apply to WTO accessions, unless a member requested a vote or consen-
sus could not be reached. The Basic Rules, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c2s2p1_e.htm (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015). 
 33. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Decision-Making in the World Trade Or-
ganization, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 51  (2005), 
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/1/51.short.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Douglas A. Irwin, International Trade Agreements, LIBR. OF ECON. AND LIBERTY, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/InternationalTradeAgreements.html (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2015). 
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export goods and services to their trading partner markets.  By reduc-
ing the trade restrictions, countries that are partners in a free trade 
agreement are at a competitive advantage.  For example, if Mexico 
wishes to sell bicycles to the United States for sixty dollars and Japan 
wishes to sell bicycles to the United States for fifty dollars, both face 
a twenty-dollar tariff.37  However, the tariff is eliminated for Mexican 
goods because it is a party to the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA).38  As a result, Japan must pay the twenty-dollar tar-
iff, increasing the cost of each bicycle to seventy dollars.  In this spe-
cific example, U.S. consumers are able to save ten dollars per bicycle 
by purchasing the bicycle from the Mexican producer.39  Although 
the U.S. government does not receive tariff revenue from the goods 
being exchanged, economists have shown that the benefits of this 
trade diversion exceed the costs because it increases overall trade.40 
D. TTIP’s Asia-Pacific Counterpart – TPP  
The United States is negotiating a similar free trade agreement to 
TTIP with Asia, known as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). The 
following countries are parties to TPP: Australia, Brunei, Canada, 
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and 
Vietnam.41  The three main objectives of TPP are to increase markets 
for exports, provide a basis for broad Asia-Pacific regional economic 
integration, and increase the competitiveness of the participating 
states.42  According to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), TPP 
consists of five features that will make it a landmark free trade 
agreement.43  First, TPP will include a provision for comprehensive 
market access by eliminating tariffs and other barriers to trade.44  Se-
cond, TPP’s structure will create full regionalization by including the 
internal development of production and supply chains among its 
 
 37. Id  
 38. Id.   
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Joseph Laroski, Trade Negotiations: What was Accomplished This Year, LAW 360 
(Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/495559/trade-negotiations-what-was-
accomplished-this-year. China is not party to TTP and its negotiations. Id. 
 42. Backer, supra note 1, at 53. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 54. 
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members.45  Third, TPP will focus on inter-agreement coherence.46  
Fourth, TPP will help develop trade in emerging technologies, such 
as green and digital technologies.47  Finally, TPP is structured as a 
“living-agreement” where it is meant to be a work in progress and the 
scope is meant to be fairly comprehensive.48  
Combined, the nations involved in TPP and TTIP negotiations, 
constitute ninety percent of the worlds’ current trade deficit with the 
United States and it is estimated that in 2013 the absence of these 
agreements cost the global economy at least 3.3 million jobs.49  Both 
of these calculations indicate that partnerships, like TPP and TTIP, 
will have major benefits in the international trading system because 
they allow for sustainable trade growth, a relevant missing trading 
factor over the past few decades. For international organizations, 
such as the WTO, TPP presents an opportunity to revert back to best 
practices by establishing an alternate framework where smaller 
groups of individual states can work together to create a common 
scheme, with agreed upon principles, and represent the major priori-
ties for those within the practice of international trade.  
E. Dispute Resolution at the WTO 
At the World Trade Organization, a dispute arises when one 
country adopts a trade policy measure or takes some action that one 
or more fellow WTO members considers to be in violation of or in 
non-compliance with one or multiple WTO agreements.50  Recently, 
during the Uruguay Round agreement, more concrete and defined 
procedures for the dispute settlement process were established.51  The 
most notable change regarding this process is that rulings are now au-
tomatically adopted unless there is a consensus to reject a ruling; 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Backer, supra note 1, at 54. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Terrance Stewart, Trade Imbalances Must be Addressed in Trade Negotiations, LAW 
360 (2014) http://www.law360.com/articles/511462/trade-imbalances-must-be-
addressed-in-trade-negotiations (stating that approximately 3.7 million jobs were lost 
in 2013 through trade deficit in goods). 
 50. Settling Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (JULY 2011), 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap3_e.pdf (stating that a 
third group of countries may declare an interest in the case and enjoy some rights).   
 51. Id. 
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meaning, if a country wants to block a ruling it must persuade all oth-
er WTO members, including its adversary, to share its view.52  The 
Uruguay Round agreement also recognized that prompt settlement is 
essential for the WTO to function effectively, and as a result, meth-
ods other than court or tribunal, such as consultation and mediation, 
are preferred methods of dispute resolution.53  Under this system, to 
correct its fault, the WTO member in violation must offer compensa-
tion or suffer a suitable penalty.54    Dispute settlement is the central 
pillar of the WTO and functions as an important contributor to the 
stability of the global economy.55  TTIP would strengthen the WTO 
by allowing it to focus on its central pillar; and set a stronger prece-
dent to enforce rules that continuously make the trading system more 
timely, secure, and predictable.  
Issue 
A. Understanding U.S.-EU Regulatory Differences and TTIP 
Regulatory principles are methodologies for structuring regula-
tions that provide frameworks for regulatory decision-making.56  
Each regulatory principle prioritizes certain values over others. For 
instance, the cost-benefit analysis prioritizes economic benefits 
whereas precautionary analysis prioritizes health and safety con-
cerns.57  Trade-related regulatory principles include revenue collec-
tion, safety and security, environment and health, consumer protec-
tion, and trade policy.58 
Executive Order 12866, issued by President Clinton, indicates 
that the primary regulatory principle in the United States is the cost-
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. T. Sandra Fung, Note, Negotiations Regulatory Coherence: The Costs and Conse-
quences of Disparate Regulatory Principles in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership Agreement Between the United States and the European Union, 47 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 445, 448 (2014). 
 57. Id at 449.  
 58. Andrew Grainger, Customs and Trade Facilitation: From Concepts to Implementa-
tion, 2 WORLD CUSTOMS J. 17, 18 (2008), 
http://www.worldcustomsjournal.org/media/wcj/-
2008/1/customs_and_trade_facilitation_from_concepts_to_implementation.pdf 
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benefit analysis.59  As a result, the American regulatory scheme fa-
vors economic benefits and is predetermined to value market factors 
and monetary costs and benefits.60  Conversely, the European Union 
implements the precautionary principle when establishing regulations 
and pays close attention to the potentially dangerous effects of a 
product where levels of scientific uncertainty trump quantitative 
analysis.61   
Despite the difference in regulatory principles, Michael Froman, 
a U.S. Trade Representative and head U.S. advisor on TTIP negotia-
tions, stated concern over this difference is “largely anachronistic” in 
relation to the Partnership.62  Froman notes that strict reliance on each 
principle is an oversimplification of both U.S. and EU regulatory 
schemes.63  A modified regulatory scheme that recognizes both U.S. 
and EU regulatory principles is therefore possible and allows TTIP to 
come to fruition.   Cecilia Malmström, EU Trade Commissioner and 
head EU advisor for TTIP negotiations, reiterated that the most valu-
able aspect of the Partnership would be in the regulatory form.64  She 
stated, “I would include ways to encourage EU and U.S. authorities 
[to] talk to each other as they set new rules that will have a Trans-
Atlantic impact, right from the beginning of the process . . . and ways 
to help them cooperate on developing international rules.”65   
Both the U.S. and the EU acknowledge how important collabora-
tion is in order to rectify the differences in the rulemaking processes 
and that a solution emerges by facilitating the free flow of commerce, 
through TTIP.  Congressman William R. Keating, representative of 
the ninth district of Massachusetts, reiterated this important economic 
concept at the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee 
hearing on National Security Benefits of Trade Agreements with Asia 
and Europe.  He stated, “Since this agreement is between two econ-
omies that share a strong commitment to the rule of law, transparen-
cy, and free markets, it can help elevate health, safety, labor, and en-
 
 59. Fung, supra note 56. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 450. 
 62. Id. at 452. 
 63. Id. at 448. 
 64. Lawson, supra note 17. 
 65. Id. 
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vironmental standards worldwide.”66  Congressman Keating’s state-
ment further exemplifies the strategic big picture implications of the 
Partnership. 
B. The WTO’s Failure as Rule-Maker 
The weakening of the WTO has been attributed to multi-polarity, 
which resulted in massive changes to the power structure within the 
WTO.67  When the WTO was created at the conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round Trade Negotiation, overall power was in the hands of the 
QUAD countries – United States, the European Communities, Cana-
da, and Japan.68  However, the BRICS countries, Brazil, Russia, In-
dia, China, and South Africa, now have more economic influence and 
are recognized as global economic players.69  Moreover, both the EU 
and the U.S. have suffered major economic downturns, and the U.S. 
bears the additional domestic burden of the aftereffects of the Iraq 
and Afghan Wars.70  
At WTO negotiations, the BRICS and the developed countries, 
primarily the U.S. and EU, have not met eye-to-eye.  The confronta-
tions have made trade negotiations and compromises extremely chal-
lenging.71  Furthermore, the increased WTO membership makes 
reaching a consensus difficult, as there is an increase in dissimilar in-
terests among the membership.72  The WTO cannot continue to gov-
ern the international trading system in today’s diversified economic 
and political system.  The range of national interests and functions of 
each WTO member state has made it too burdensome for the WTO as 
an international organization to expand trade liberalization or update 
 
 66. National Security Benefits of Trade Agreements with Asia and Europe Terrorism: 
Hearing Before Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcomm. on Foreign Affairs, 
114th Cong. 3 (2015) (statement of Congressman Keating, Minority Ranking Member) 
[hereinafter Congressional Hearing]. 
 67. Mitsuo Matsushita, A View on Future Roles of the WTO: Should There be More Soft 
Law in the WTO?, 17 (3) J. INT’L ECON. L. 701 (2014). Australia is also sometimes 
considered relevant in terms of “QUAD” countries and will therefore sometimes be 
involved with these negotiations. Id. 
 68. Id. at 702.  The QUAD countries constitute the four biggest traders within the WTO 
and are examined approximately once every two years. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 704. 
 72. Id. 
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trade rules.  Therefore, bilateral free trade agreements, like TTIP, are 
a smart solution to fulfill the role of rule-maker in international trade. 
C. U.S. Hegemony and Multipolarity 
A hegemon is a dominating power that is historically linked to 
the international economic infrastructure.73  Since liberal economic 
world order was established in 1945 through the Bretton Woods 
Agreement, the United States has been the underlying hegemon.74  
However, when the United States’ economic crisis occurred in 2008, 
developing countries, specifically the BRICS, were able to catch up 
with the West in both economic and political terms.75  The decline of 
U.S. hegemony has affected the entire system of the WTO because it 
relies on American supremacy and its ability to produce political and 
economic capital.76  This theory is known as the “hegemonic stability 
theory.”77  Under this theory, if the U.S., in its role as hegemon, is in 
relative decline, then the trading system will naturally fragment be-
cause the U.S. is not accomplishing its prerogative to provide for the 
public good in an open, stable, and international economic order.78  
The field of international relations is constantly in flux, and power 
structures shift over time.  As new actors have entered into the trade 
arena, the WTO has struggled to maintain influence.  This world dis-
organization is illustrated by the fact that the WTO’s most recent 
trade rounds and conferences – ‘Doha’ and ‘Bali’ – led to a stale-
mate.79   
i. Doha Development Round  
The Doha Development Round, often referred to as the Doha 
round trade talks, launched in 2001 and is the most recent cycle of 
 
 73. Gordon Wong, The Beginning of World Trade Disorganization?, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 
15, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/the-beginning-of-world-trade-
disorganization/.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Wong, supra note 73.  
 79. Id.  
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WTO trade negotiations.80  The WTO has held a total of nine rounds 
of multilateral trade talks since the end of the WWII, but the Doha 
Round is the first to focus on helping developing countries join the 
global marketplace, in hopes of boosting their overall economies.81  
Essentially, the goal of the Doha round trade talks is to “make it easi-
er for goods and services to be bought and sold across national 
boarders.”82 To reach this goal, the Doha Round specifically focuses 
on tariffs (i.e. import taxes) placed on a variety of consumer and non-
consumer products, such as cars and wheat.83   
The Doha round trade talks also take into consideration that 
when decreasing or eliminating tariffs, restrictions may be imple-
mented to promote fairness in the marketplace. Specifically, the Doha 
round trade talks discuss the use of subsidies to restrict countries 
from lowering taxes and regulatory barriers that affect the cross-
border trade in services, such as banking and consulting, and negoti-
ating new intellectual property rules on things such as drugs and cop-
yrighted works.”84  
The Doha Round negotiators represent all WTO members, where 
about two-thirds of the members consist of developing nations.85  
These negotiators have made little to no progress over the past few 
years because trade officials negotiated under the single premise that 
“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,” resulting in frequent 
deadlocks.86  
ii. Bali Ministerial Conference  
The Bali Ministerial conference, emanating out of the Doha 
round trade talks, occurred in December 2013.87  At first glance, the 
talks seemed promising because the Trade Facilitation Agreement 
 
 80. Doha Round Trade Talks - Explainer, THE GUARDIAN, 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/sep/03/doha-round-trade-talks-
explainer (last visited Mar. 29, 2015). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. EU, US, China, and India tend to dominate the talks.  
 86. Doha Round Trade Talks, supra note 80. Doha round was set to conclude in Geneva in 
July 2008 but after ten days of talks, negotiations broke down over a dispute between 
the U.S. and India, in regards to rules governing trade in agricultural goods. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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(TFA), a trade deal that would be a first for the WTO since its crea-
tion, was set to pass.88  The Trade Facilitation Agreement mostly 
benefitted developing countries because it created roughly twenty-
one million jobs and boosted developing countries’ GDP by $523 bil-
lion, without cutting tariffs.89  However, just before ratification, the 
trade talks fell through, and India withdrew its support.90  
This WTO trade negotiation failure further supports the increas-
ingly regarded notion that the WTO is a divided forum that cannot 
successfully advance.91  Multi-polarity has caused the WTO to fail 
but a return to capitalism, through agreements like TTIP, provide the 
WTO a lifeline. The Partnership allows states to define their own ad-
vantageous gains from trade in a balanced, negotiated manner that 
benefits all parties.92  In turn, countries keenest to promote trade will 
reap the positive effects and tangible outcomes of the free trade 
agreements.93 
Analysis 
A. Factors Affecting TTIP’s Implementation  
The delay in TTIP negotiations has largely been due political 
changes in leadership on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.  Since 
TTIP negotiations began in 2013, all key leadership positions in the 
EU have been filled by new representation and some time is required 
 
 
 
 
 
 88. Bailing out From Bali, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 9, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21611088-indias-scuppering-
latest-trade-talks-leaves-no-one-better-bailing-out.  The Trade Facilitation Agreement 
is currently the only deal that has been concluded and awaits ratification by two-thirds 
of the WTO members. Douglas Lippoldt, Progress on Trade in 2015, HSBC (Mar. 2, 
2015), http://www.hsbc.com/news-and-insight/2015/progress-on-trade-in-2015.  
 89. Bailing out From Bali, supra note 88. 
 90. Id.   
 91. Id.   
 92. Wong, supra note 73. 
 93. Bailing out From Bali, supra note 88.  
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to adapt to TTIP and its negotiation process.94  Although former 
Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht, European Council President 
Herman Van Rompuy, European Commission President José Manuel 
Barroso, and High Representative Catherine Ashton unanimously 
supported and promoted TTIP,95 it may be too soon to express unan-
imous consent in support of the Partnership under the new leadership.  
Moreover, by the time the European leadership is comfortable in its 
new role, the U.S. political landscape will be focusing on the 2016 
Presidential campaign.  The recent midterm elections in the U.S., in 
which the Republican Party took over majority-rule in both chambers 
of Congress, clearly affected TTIP’s negotiations because the re-
election process focused mainly on domestic concerns and not on in-
ternational matters such as TTIP.     
Despite the effects of political adjustment, negotiations are likely 
to swiftly resume in 2015. Both the U.S. and the EU, consistently 
acknowledge that trade is an important and a relevant factor in the 
global economy and an agreement like TTIP can only advance eco-
nomic growth.   
i. The European Union Demonstrates its Commitment to TTIP  
The EU proved its dedication to the negotiations by placing top 
trade experts at the forefront of the discussions and negotiations.  The 
EU has permanently placed Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Director in the 
Directorate General for Trade in the EU Commission, Director Gen-
eral Jean Luc Demarty, and other key officials presiding in the work-
ing groups in charge of conducting TTIP negotiations on behalf of 
the EU.96  
ii. The United States Demonstrates its Commitment to TTIP 
The U.S. has labeled 2015 as a “fresh start” for TTIP talks under 
the new leadership of the European Commission.97  To prove that in-
 
 94. Jean De Ruyt, Major Changing of the Guard at European Commission, LAW 360 
(2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/562195/major-changing-of-the-guard-at-
european-commission. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Alex Lawson, International Trade Developments to Watch in 2015, LAW 360 (Jan. 2, 
2015, 1:45 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/605633/international-trade-
developments-to-watch-in-2015. 
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ternational trade and corresponding negotiations are at the forefront 
of its agenda, the White House and Congress reinstated the Trade 
Promotion Authority (TPA), colloquially known as fast-track negoti-
ating authority.98  TPA allows Congress to “craft a blueprint for all 
U.S. trade agreements in exchange for holding amendment-free votes 
on those pacts once they are completed by the White House.”99  To 
further assist international organizations, like the WTO, the U.S. is 
paying close attention to smaller sectoral-agreements, like those 
aimed at cutting tariffs on environmental goods and liberalizing trade 
in services.100   
Furthermore, Russian sanctions, enforced due to recent and on-
going turmoil in the Ukraine, have influenced trade talks because in-
vestors and exporters are bracing for the newly passed Ukraine Free-
dom Support Act of 2014.101  Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine places 
an unwanted risk on the trans-Atlantic alliance between the U.S. and 
the EU. However, being parties to the TTIP negotiations strengthens 
the U.S.-EU relationship and reinforces the united front that the U.S. 
and the EU have maintained throughout the Ukraine crisis.102  TTIP 
highlights the virtues of the Western model and sends a powerful sig-
nal to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and other authoritarian re-
gimes that the U.S. and the EU remain as unified as they ever were.103  
This type of connectivity promotes prosperity for democratic princi-
ples and international stability.104  
iii. TTIP Timeline and Economic Effects 
TTIP would help the EU economies bounce back from the global 
recession. A study conducted at the European Commission suggested 
TTIP could add roughly $142 billion to the EU economy and roughly 
$112 billion to the U.S. economy.105  In terms of GDP, this is equiva-
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Congressional Hearing, supra note 66 (statement of Congressman Keating, Minority 
Ranking Member). 
 103. Id 
 104. Id. 
 105. Trading Places, THE TIMES (LONDON) (Jan. 15, 2015), 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/leaders/article4323540.html.  
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lent to adding 0.5 percent to Europe’s GDP and 0.4 percent to Ameri-
ca’s GDP.106  The Partnership will provide Europe with the economic 
boost it needs because, by collaborating with the U.S. on a trade deal 
that grants market freedom and guarantees fair and legal procedures 
when transferring goods, European businesses will have more oppor-
tunity to export goods at a much lower cost. EU Trade Commission-
er, Cecilia Malmström, reiterated how important passing TTIP sooner 
rather than later is for Europe when she explained that an ideal TTIP 
agreement eliminates duties on the vast majority of goods as soon as 
TTIP becomes good law.107     
B. Benefits of WTO Change in Leadership 
In 2013, Roberto Azevedo assumed the position of Director 
General of the WTO.108  When Azevedo accepted his role as Director 
General, he was aware the WTO was in need of some adjustments.  
Azevedo and his team must find a way to make the WTO stay rele-
vant.  The WTO can do this by advancing a multilateral agenda (i.e. 
Doha Development Round), focusing on trading nations and not par-
ties to partnerships, and achieving a breakthrough in plurilateral ne-
gotiations that have WTO focus, such as the Trade in Services 
Agreement (TISA) and the Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA).109  In addition, the WTO provides beneficial and necessary 
technical assistance to least developed countries (LDCs) as well as 
the Aid-for-Trade program, both of which have been important to 
many WTO members and are likely to continue to support the 
world’s least developed economies.110  New leadership at the WTO 
also affords the organization a chance to redistribute its focus in an 
area where it has a proven success record: dispute resolution. 
C. Reviving the WTO vis-à-vis TTIP  
The WTO is at a stalemate.  The current Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) has failed to bring about innovative ideas to generate 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Lawson, supra note 17. 
 108. Terence Stewart, Some Thoughts as New WTO Team Takes the Helm, LAW 360 (Sept. 
5, 2013). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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new avenues for rule making in areas such as agriculture, investment, 
competition policy, and origin rules.111  The creation of TTIP would 
fill the gap as rule-maker and allow the WTO to narrow its focus and 
excel at dispute settlement.  
i. WTO and Dispute Settlement 
WTO dispute settlement has compulsory jurisdiction over the 
settlement of trade disputes that occur among WTO members.112  For 
an international organization to implement rebuttable multinational 
trade agreements and ascertain rule of law due to an effective dispute, 
settlement mechanism is an important accomplishment within the 
field of international trade.  In less than twenty years, more than 500 
dispute cases have been filed with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
and Panels and about 300 cases have been decided by the Appellate 
Body.113  Because the WTO relies on legal rules to resolve trade dis-
putes, members cannot resort to economic and political power.114  By 
evaluating the legitimacy of the legal claims, parties to the dispute 
prevail not on the superior bargaining power in terms of size and in-
fluence, but on the merits of the case.115  Most members continue to 
use the WTO dispute system and generally comply with its adverse 
rulings.116  This system presents an advantage to developing nations 
that lack bargaining power with larger trade entities, such as the 
United States and the European Union, and institutes stability and 
predictability in international trade.117  A preferential free trade 
agreement, like the Partnership, can provide trade rules in areas 
where the WTO has failed.118  
ii. WTO’s New Role as Coordinator 
Instead of acting as negotiator, the WTO must take on the role of 
coordinator when governing the international trading system.  The 
WTO achieves this role by monitoring not only TTIP’s activities but 
 
 111. Matsushita, supra note 67. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Some Thoughts as New WTO Team Takes the Helm, supra note 108. 
 117. Matsushita, supra note 67. 
 118. Id. 
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also all other relevant and pertinent free trade agreements, like 
TTIP’s counterpart in Asia. The WTO can coordinate the activities of 
the participating members to the free trade agreements and administer 
advice, perhaps in the form of advisory opinions and reports, thus en-
suring the success of these agreements through a “soft law” approach. 
Fortunately, the WTO already has a mechanism in place to func-
tion as coordinator.  The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) is 
a mechanism incorporated in the WTO to collect and distribute data 
with the intent of forming recommendations for WTO members to 
improve their trade systems and achieve greater transparency by un-
derstanding the trade policies and practices of other members.119   
This notion is formally incorporated in Annex 3 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement.120  The Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) was created 
under the TPRM to publish non-binding reports and recommenda-
tions that may not be used for dispute settlement procedures.121  Spe-
cifically, part G of the Marrakesh Agreement, entitled “Overview of 
Development in the International Trading Environment,” requires the 
TPRB to generate “an annual overview of developments in the inter-
national trading environment that are having an impact on the multi-
lateral trading system.”122  Conclusively, to maximize the success of 
both TTIP and the WTO, the TPRM can substitute multilateral 
agreements for bilateral agreements and promote compatibility and 
cooperation between the U.S. and the EU, both WTO members, as 
the TPRB oversees the rule making process in its role as coordinator 
for the WTO.  
D. Significance of Reducing Non-tariff Barriers to Trade  
The Partnership allows for a significant reduction in non-tariff 
barriers to trade (NTBs) between the U.S. and the EU.  Under TTIP, 
 
 119. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 1 1869 
U.N.T.S. 379 [hereinafter TPRM].  
 120. Id.  The Marrakesh Agreement defines the scope, functions and structure of the WTO 
and provides a comprehensive set of rules designed to make it easier to compete in to-
day’s global marketplace. All WTO members are parties to this agreement. U.S. Dep’t 
of Commerce, Marrakesh Agreement: Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
TCC, 
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/WTO_Marrakesh_gui
de.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).   
 121. Matsushita, supra note 67.  
 122. TPRM, supra note 119. 
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aligning domestic standards, cutting costs imposed by bureaucracy 
and regulations, and liberalizing trade in services and public pro-
curement will reduce NTBs.123 Early reports of the negotiations indi-
cate that the proposal is ambitious. The mandate seeks to eliminate 
25% of NTB costs and 100% of tariffs between the United States and 
the European Union as well as achieve a 10% reduction in trade costs 
from NTBs and a removal of 98% of tariffs.124  Nevertheless, the re-
duction of NTBs with regulatory modification, under TTIP, will ben-
efit the U.S. and EU economies by increasing job opportunities for 
both as trade moves more freely. 
E. TTIP’s Effects on Third Parties and Third Party Nations 
i. Advantages 
TTIP is able to address many of the trade imbalances that have 
affected trade relationships amongst WTO members. For instance, a 
large trade deficit between the U.S. and the EU is in part due to the 
WTO’s differential treatment between direct and indirect taxes.125 
The current practice allows the EU to rebate taxes, which have value 
added taxes (VATs) of fifteen to twenty-seven percent, on goods ex-
ported to the U.S. and assess these taxes at the border on imports.126  
In turn, the U.S. does not have remedies for the large subsidies pro-
vided by the EU on exports because the U.S. has no federal indirect 
tax system and the rebate associated with indirect taxes on exports 
has been excluded by the GATT, as well as from the WTO subsidy 
disciplines.127  Additionally, because U.S. exporters face large taxes 
on importation,128 many businesses cannot sell within the market they 
wish to profit in.  The Partnership can eliminate these differential 
treatments.  By removing penalization in trade, TTIP will add mil-
lions of manufacturing and agriculture jobs for both the U.S. and the 
 
 123. Reid Whitten, The Race for Riches in US-EU Trade Begins, LAW 360 (Apr.18, 2013, 
5:09 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/433752/the-race-for-riches-in-us-eu-trade-
begins. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Stewart, supra note 49.  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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EU.129  Even though the Partnership is specifically tailored to the 
trading relationship between the U.S. and the EU, TTIP will have a 
positive ripple effect on third party nations, like other WTO mem-
bers, due to undeniable globalization at the international trade level. 
ii. Disadvantages  
Because TTIP is a partnership between the U.S. and the EU, the 
majority of WTO members are not included.  With most of the de-
veloping world shut out, critics worry these countries will be denied a 
voice during negotiations.130  Additionally, with the exception of 
China, all BRICS countries−India, Brazil, and South Africa−have not 
been invited to participate in TTIP’s counterpart – TPP.131  However, 
if the WTO is able to reignite enthusiasm for its global free trade 
talks then lesser-developed countries have an opportunity to have a 
seat at the free trade expansion table.  
There are also critics who fear that TTIP negotiations no longer 
address protectionism but protection.132  Critics define protection as 
“promoting the interests of transnational capital by downgrading the 
defense of human health, the natural world, labor rights, and the poor 
and vulnerable from predatory corporate practices.”133  As a result, 
critics argue that this new state of “post-democracy” leaves the elec-
toral and parliamentary system uninhabited by political power.134  
This critique lacks authority because the same critics define protec-
tionism as the idea that free trade is promoted by removing trade tar-
iffs,135 which is exactly what TTIP seeks to provide for the U.S. and 
the EU to reach its goal of liberalizing trade successfully.  
 
 129. Id.  
 
130. Barrie McKenna, Sweeping Megaregional Deals Leaving Developing World Behind, 
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/sweeping-megaregional-trade-deals-are-leaving-developing-world-
behind/article22853075/. 
 131. Id. 
 132. George Monbiot, The TTIP Trade Deal Will Throw Equality Before the Law on the 
Corporate Bonfire, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2015, 3:46 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/13/ttip-trade-deal-transatlantic-
trade-investment-treaty.   
 133. Id.   
 134. Id.   
 135. Id.   
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F. Secrecy of TTIP negotiations 
The Partnership is challenged politically by an increasing 
amount of interest groups, nongovernmental organizations, a substan-
tial part of the public opinion, and politicians in countries within the 
EU.136  Understandably, these various parties try to gain and request 
influence in the TTIP negotiations.  To mitigate these concerns, key 
U.S. and EU representatives continuously release documents demon-
strating transparency during the TTIP negotiations.  
i. Significant Actions Taken by the European Union to Promote TTIP 
In late November 2014, EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malm-
ström circulated transparency proposals in an effort to give all Euro-
pean Parliament members access to important negotiating docu-
ments.137  To incorporate civic engagement in Partnership 
negotiations, Commissioner Malmström made various documents 
available on the European Commission Directorate General Trade 
website.138  A public list of relevant TTIP documents shared between 
European Parliament and the European Council are published on a 
regular basis as well as a list indicating who is meeting with political 
leaders and senior officials throughout the course of the negotia-
tions.139   
In early January 2015, Malmström released eight TTIP negotiat-
ing texts including position papers representing the EU’s positions on 
various areas, such as competition, food safety, and animal and plant 
health.140  These fact sheets are written in laymen’s terms so public 
stakeholders can easily comprehend the complex legal documents.141  
With the release of new and additional documents, Malmström hopes 
that the increase in transparency will also transition into an increase 
 
 136. De Ruyt, supra note 94. 
 137. Alex Lawson, EU Approves Proposals to Open Up Trade Talks with US, LAW 360 
(Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/599332/eu-approves-proposals-to-
open-up-trade-talks-with-us.   
 138. Id. Website includes minutes with brief summary of meeting agenda and list of partic-
ipants in attendance. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Alex Lawson, EU Discloses Litany of Secret Texts in U.S. Trade Talks, LAW 360 (Jan. 
7, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/609180/eu-discloses-litany-of-secret-texts-
in-us-trade-talks.   
 141. Id. 
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in public support for the massive trade deal.142  Alan Wolff, Senior 
Counsel at McKenna Long & Alridge LLP stated, “[t]he attempt is to 
approach the drafting of TTIP as a world standard, or at least a stand-
ard that each can apply in further negotiations each has with oth-
ers.”143   
ii. Significant Actions Taken by the United States to Promote TTIP 
U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman indicated promotion 
of transparency of TTIP and its negotiations for the U.S. when USTR 
released a “plain English” fact sheet that relayed the Obama admin-
istration’s interest and effort to cooperate with the newly Republican 
controlled Congress to pass TTIP and encourage public conversation 
regarding the negotiation process.144  Froman stated:  
We are always looking for new ways to engage the public 
and to seek views that will help inform and guide our trade 
policy, and enhancing transparency will remain a priority, 
consistent with the ability to deliver on our ultimate mis-
sion, which is to deliver agreements that achieve the maxi-
mum possible benefit for the American people…that’s our 
focus.145   
USTR has also enhanced transparency by providing congres-
sional committees with a preview of every proposal prior to the pro-
posal being negotiated during committee meetings.146  
Throughout 2015, Malmström and Froman have met multiple 
times to collaborate and advance TTIP negotiations and mitigate 
points of contention to bring ratification of this important trade deal 
to the forefront.147      
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Joe Van Acker, USTR Hits Back at Allegations of Secrecy in Trade Talks, LAW 360 
(Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/610344/ustr-hits-back-at-allegations-
of-secrecy-in-trade-talks.   
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Alex Lawson, US, EU Trade Leaders Prepare for New Round of TTIP Talks, LAW 360 
(Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/602881/us-eu-trade-leaders-prepare-
for-new-round-of-ttip-talks.   
4 TTIP A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/16  6:36 PM 
2015-2016   UB Journal of International Law 
156 
Conclusion 
TTIP promotes true reciprocity in international trade and must be 
implemented for two main reasons.  First, by opening up both U.S. 
and EU markets, consumers collectively have access to a greater 
spectrum of goods.  Critics fear that the Partnership puts local busi-
nesses at risk and favors privatization of business, a neo-liberalist 
idea. However, when consumers have more choices as to which good 
to purchase, a healthy economy exists. TTIP negotiators recognize 
the importance of competitive market advantage and believe in the 
need for a modified and uniform regulatory system between the U.S. 
and the EU.  Second, the Partnership allows the WTO to redistribute 
its focus by entertaining a “soft law” approach and capitalize on its 
strength: dispute resolution. TTIP is the future for international trade, 
and negotiations must continue to ensure the agreement passes and 
economic success for the global economy is secured. 
 
